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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This appeal was perfected to the Utah Supreme Court pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated, Section 78-2-2(3) (j) and Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 3. It subsequently was transferred to the Utah
Court of Appeals which has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code
Annotated, Section 78-2a-3(2)(k).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES
The sole issue presented for review is whether the lower court
erred in granting summary judgment in favor of appellee Lexington
Insurance Company on the ground that it was not an insurer of
M & C Management Corporation in connection with an injury suffered
by appellant Harry Naylor.

Appellant Harry Naylor maintains that

triable questions of material fact respecting the existence of this
insurer/insured

relationship

precluded

the

lower

court

from

granting summary judgment.
The standard of review is as follows. The party against whom
summary judgment was granted (in this instance, the appellant,
Harry Naylor) is entitled to have all facts and inferences from the
same examined in a light most favorable to him, and the judgment
should be affirmed only where no triable question of material fact
is present.

This Court reviews issues of law giving no deference

to the views of the lower court. See, e.g.f English v. Kienke, 774
P.2d 1154 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), aff'd, 848 P.2d 153 (Utah 1993);
Hunt v. ESI Engineering, Inc., 808 P.2d 1137 (Utah Ct. App. 1991),
cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991); Winegar v. Froerer Corp.,
813 P.2d 104 (Utah 1991).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant/intervenor Harry Naylor submits this statement of
the case, including a description of the nature of the case, the
course of proceedings, the disposition in the lower court, and the
relevant facts. For convenience in reference, the appellant Harry
Naylor shall be called "Naylor," the appellee Lexington Insurance
Company

shall

be

called

"Lexington,"

and M

& C Management

Corporation shall be called "M & C."
Nature of the Case
This was an action for declaratory judgment to determine
whether Lexington was the insurer under a policy of liability
insurance of M & C in connection with an injury suffered by Naylor.
Course of Proceedings
Lexington filed a complaint and then an amended complaint
under the Utah Declaratory Judgment Statute, naming M & C as the
defendant, and seeking a determination that Lexington had no
insurer/insured relationship with M & C. The amended complaint is
found at R. 38-74.

Naylor sought leave to intervene, on the

grounds that M & C essentially was defunct and unable to defend,
and that Naylor was the only party in interest with incentive and
means to action by Lexington.
intervene was granted.

R. 85-88.

R. 107-108.

The motion for leave to

Lexington then moved for

summary judgment, arguing numerous grounds, such as the absence of
an insurer/insured relationship with M & C, failure by M & C to
comply with the covenant of cooperation in the insurance contract,
failure of M & C to give the required notice under the insurance
7

contract, and so forth.

R. 137-233.

This motion was granted on

the question of the insurer/insured relationship, but on no other
basis.

Reporter's Transcript of Hearing on December 6, 1993,

before the Honorable Michael R. Murphy, pages 39-40, at R. 491-492.
Final judgment was entered January 20, 1994. R. 440-444. Naylor
timely brought this appeal. R. 445-447.
Disposition in Lower Court
As described above, Lexington's motion for summary judgment
was granted on the issue of the insurer/insured relationship.
Relevant Facts
The

relevant

facts

are

presented

below

in

roughly

chronological order. While reviewing these facts, the Court should
bear in mind that the instant action for declaratory relief from
which

this appeal

arises

is one of three related lawsuits,

described below.
1. In February, 1990, Naylor filed suit for personal injury
against three entities, Coordinated Spa Services, Inc. ("CSS"),
Fitness America, Inc. ("Fitness") , and M & C.

This suit was

commenced in the Third Judicial District Court for the State of
Utah, and because it is pending before the Honorable John A. Rokich
of that Court, it sometimes will be referenced in this brief as
"the Rokich litigation." Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph
1 and Exhibit A, at R. 297-298 and 304-309.
2. In March, 1990, the complaint in the Rokich litigation was
answered for CSS by an attorney, Thomas J. Klc ("Klc").

CSS and

Klc are insurance adjusters, licensed as such in the State of Utah.
8

There is evidence, as indicated below, that they were acting in the
capacity of adjustors on behalf of Lexington in connection with the
injury to Naylor and the litigation between Naylor, Fitness, and
M & C, or in other words, the Rokich litigation. In the answer for
CSS, Klc represented that Fitness and M & C were legally defunct
and devoid of assets, including presumably insurance, and that in
light of these facts, any defense to the complaint probably would
be pointless.

Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 2 and

Exhibit B, at R. 298 and 310-311.
3. Consistent with this answer to the complaint in the Rokich
litigation, CSS and Klc represented to the attorney for Naylor,
Kathleen McConkie ("McConkie"), that there was no insurance for
Fitness or M & C which would cover the injury suffered by Naylor.
Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 3, at R. 298.
4. McConkie, however, persisted in this line of inquiry, using
discovery to test the representation of CSS and Klc concerning the
lack of insurance for Fitness or M & C.

CSS and Klc finally

acknowledged, in response to discovery requests, that at a certain
point in time they had a contractual duty to procure insurance for
Fitness and M & C, and that in satisfaction of this duty, they had
obtained a policy of insurance from Lexington.

Affidavit of

Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 4 and Exhibit C, at R. 298-299 and
312-335.
5. After considerable delay, CSS and Klc produced a copy of
the Lexington policy. The copy produced, however, did not contain
an endorsement naming M & C as an insured, even though, as noted
9

above, the answers to discovery indicated that the insurance was
procured for M & C.

Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 5,

at R. 299.
6. CSS and Klc then gave McConkie permission to work directly
with Lexington in resolving the question of insurance for M & C and
recompense in that regard for the injury suffered by Naylor.
Pursuant to this permission, in October, 1990, McConkie called the
office of Lexington in Massachusetts.

Speaking with an employee

at Lexington during this call, McConkie learned that CSS and Klc
had adjusted claims in times past for Lexington.

Indeed, the

employee exuded that CSS and Klc had adjusted many claims to the
satisfaction

of

Lexington.

Thereafter,

McConkie

wrote

to

Lexington, asking for settlement of the claim of Naylor against
Fitness and M & C. This correspondence was accompanied by a large
packet of claim
description

information, including a profile of Naylor,

of the accident, medical records, and the like.

Pleadings from the Rokich litigation between Naylor, Fitness, and
M & C also were attached. These pleadings included the admissions
of CSS, via Klc, that insurance had been procured for Fitness and
M & C through Lexington.

The Lexington policy in this regard (as

produced by CSS and Klc) was attached as an exhibit to the
correspondence. McConkie invited a settlement from Lexington, but
warned that she was prepared to default the defendants in the
Rokich litigation.

The threat of default, in any event, was

implicit in the demand, since the litigation, after all, had been
pending since February, 1990.

Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie,
10

paragraph 6 and Exhibit D, at R. 299 and 336-342,
7. On January 8, 1991, Lexington responded to McConkie by
letter from an employee, Michael Knox ("Knox").

The Knox letter

referenced the "insured" under the policy in question as "Star
Health and Fitness."

The text of the letter mentioned, as

"insured," both Fitness and M & C, and disclaimed, as "insured,"
only CSS.

The text of the letter also noted the discovery

responses from CSS and Klc in the Rokich litigation which had been
attached to the correspondence from McConkie. Lexington, however,
denied coverage to any "insured" (whether Star Health, Fitness, or
M & C) on the basis of a so-called Self-Insured Retention Clause
(or "SIR") in the insurance policy, rather than on the basis, later
asserted in the instant suit, that there was no insurer/insured
relationship any of the named entities, such as M & C.

Affidavit

of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 7 and Exhibit E, at R. 299-300 and
343-346.
8. In early 1991, following this denial of coverage by
Lexington, Naylor took judgment by default against Fitness in the
Rokich litigation.

Then in the spring of 1991, as judgment

creditor of Fitness, Naylor sued Lexington in federal district
court

(before the Honorable David Sam) to collect under the

contract of insurance.

Lexington answered this suit, denying

coverage under the liability policy on various grounds, including
the contention that Fitness was not an "insured" with Lexington.
In this regard, Knox submitted an affidavit in the federal district
court action, explaining that, in his letter to McConkie, dated
11

January 8, 1991 and noted above, Knox did not mean to imply that
Fitness was an insured under the liability policy, Knox testified
in this affidavit that the only insureds under that policy were the
four entities named on the "Cover Note" and on the "Declarations
Page" of the policy.

Fitness and M & C are not listed in either

of these places. Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 8 and
Exhibit F, at R. 300 and 347-351.
9. While the federal district court litigation was pending,
and in an effort to persuade McConkie that coverage under the
contract of insurance was not available for the injury of Naylor
in any event, Lexington revealed a new copy of the liability
policy, different from the copy which earlier had been produced in
discovery in the Rokich litigation by CSS and Klc.

Lexington

invited McConkie to meet and confer respecting the implications of
this new copy of the insurance policy.

This new copy of the

insurance policy did not include an endorsement of M & C as an
insured.

McConkie, however, discovered that this new copy of the

insurance policy was bowdlerized. Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie,
paragraph 9, at R. 300-301.
10. In July, 1991, McConkie discovered an M & C endorsement
to the Lexington policy in the files of the Poulton Insurance
Agency.

She also learned that, at the time Naylor was injured, in

April, 1986, M & C was paying the premiums for this insurance to
Lexington.

Also in July, 1991, Naylor took default judgment

against M & C in the Rokich litigation.

Affidavit of Kathleen

McConkie, paragraph 10 and Exhibit G, at R. 301 and 352-368.
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11. In August, 1991, Lexington filed a motion for intervention
in the Rokich litigation. This request for intervention allegedly
was for the purpose of moving, under Rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules
of Civil Procedure, to vacate the judgment against M & C.1 The Rule
60(b) pleadings of Lexington implied that the judgment should be
overturned because M & C was defunct and bankrupt, and therefore
helpless and defenseless, and that due to a want of notice,
Lexington was

disabled

earlier

from

supplying

this defense.

(Lexington asked for intervention in the suit, however, for itself,
and not on behalf of M & C, as Lexington still was denying coverage
under the policy.)

in this batch of pleadings, Lexington also

acknowledged that the policy of insurance in question covered the
property of M & C, but denied that this policy covered the injury
of Naylor.

Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 11 and

Exhibit H, at R. 301-302 and 369-370.
12. In the fall of 1991, Lexington filed the complaint in this
action, seeking declaratory judgment against M & C respecting
coverage issues under the insurance policy.

Naylor intervened in

this action, and summary judgment ultimately was granted on the
insurer/insured issue in favor of Lexington, all as noted above.
Affidavit of Kathleen McConkie, paragraph 12, at R. 302.

This was the second motion for intervention and relief
brought by Lexington in the Rokich litigation. In the spring of
1991, shortly after Naylor had filed suit against Lexington in
federal district court, Lexington had entered the Rokich
litigation, invoking Rule 24 and Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, in connection with the judgment against Fitness.
13

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
M & C was an insured under the policy of insurance with
Lexington.
the

The determination whether M & C was an insured under

policy

of

insurance

with

Lexington

is

a

question

of

interpretation of the contract of insurance which turns upon the
intent of the parties.

Where ambiguities in this regard may be

present, the policy should be construed against the drafter,
Lexington, and in favor of a finding of coverage for M & C and the
injured party, Naylor. There is at least a dispute concerning the
intent of the parties to include M & C as an insured under the
policy with Lexington, and triable issues of material facts on this
point preclude the granting of summary judgment.
ARGUMENT
The Lower Court Erred in Granting
Summary Judgment Because There Were
Triable Issues of Material Fact
Whether M & C Was
An Insured of Lexington
The question whether M & C is an "insured" under the policy
with Lexington turns upon the intent of the parties, as that intent
may be deciphered from the language of the contract of insurance,
any endorsements to the same, and other facts and circumstances.
If there is ambiguity in the language of the policy which bears
upon the designation of the "insured," this language is construed
strictly

against

the

insurance

company,

in

this

instance,

Lexington, and in favor of the beneficiary under the policy, M &

14

C, and the injured party, Naylor.
The law, as a general rule, imposes "no requirement that a
person must be described by name in order to be an insured under
the policy.

It has been held sufficient that his identity as an

insured can be ascertained by applying the description contained
in the policy." 4 J. Appleman, INSURANCE LAW AND PRACTICE, section
2341, at 328 (rev. ed. 1968).
Likewise, "[t]he insured may be identified in a policy either
by name or by description.

As the purpose of a name is to

E.g.. Fuller v. Director of Finance, 694 P.2d 1045, 1046-1047
and n. 1 (Utah 1985) (ambiguities construed against insurer, and
"[a]n insured is entitled to the broadest protection he could have
reasonably understood to be provided by the policy"); Utah Farm
Bureau v. Orville Andrews & Son, 665 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Utah 1983)
("where the policy is ambiguous, doubt is resolved in favor of
coverage ... [s]ince a policy is drawn by the insurer, ambiguities
are construed against the insurer"); Bergera v. Ideal National Life
Insurance Company. 524 P.2d 599, 600 (Utah 1974) (intent of parties
is key to interpretation, ambiguities construed against insurer);
Whitlock v. Old American Insurance Company, 442 P.2d 26, 28 (Utah
1968) (intent of parties governs; rule of strictissimi juris; this
rule "has been applied almost universally to insurance contracts,
giving a liberal construction in favor of the insured toward the
coverage which the insured reasonably could assume he is buying and
for which he pays his premiums ... [in light of this rule, the
court has held] that the insured is entitled to the broadest
coverage he could reasonably understand from the policy"); Dienes
v. Safeco Life Insurance Company, 442 P.2d 468, 470-471 (Utah 1968)
(extended explanation giving historical grounds and practical
reasons for construing policy in favor of insured; "no ambiguous
statement is to be enforced against an insured"); P. E. Ashton
Company v. Joyner, 406 P.2d 306, 308 (Utah 1965) (rule of
construction in favor of coverage should be applied not only in
case of ambiguity, but also where there may be doubt or
uncertainty); Home Sav. & Loan v. Aetna Cas. & Sur., 817 P.2d 341
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (rules of construction which are applied to
insurance policy are applicable to applications for insurance as
well); Moore v. Energy Mut. Ins. Co., 814 P.2d 1141 (Utah Ct. App.
1991) (good general discussion of rules of construction for
insurance policies).
15

designate the person intended to be insured, any designation which
fulfills that purpose is sufficient. Moreover, when the intent to
cover a particular risk is clear, the name of the insured is not
always important," 2A G. Couch, COUCH CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW
2d, section 23.4, at 772-774 (rev. ed. 1984).
The cases support these principles, emphasizing that the
designation of an "insured" is a matter of intent between the
parties, e.g., Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Forth Corp.. 663 F.2d
751, 759 (7th Cir. 1981), and that an "insured" may be added by
endorsement to a policy, e.g., Unigard Ins. Co. v. Studer, 536 F.2d
1337 (10th Cir. 1976).3

In Utah, a party which is not identified by name in a policy
nevertheless may be a "defacto [sic] coinsured." Fashion Place
Investment, Ltd. v. Salt Lake County. 776 P.2d 941, 945 (Utah Ct.
App. 1989) (contest over rights of subrogation). See also, Lazarus
v. Manufacturers Casualty Insurance Co., 267 F.2d 634 (D. C. Cir.
1959) ("[t]he primary intent, we think, was to insure a particular
business, and not a particular person[;]" policy written for
individual using trade name, but coverage extended to partners
where the business was a partnership, even though the partnership
may have been dissolved or terminated); Providence Washington
Insurance Company v. Stanley, 403 F.2d 844 (5th Cir. 1968), on
petition for rehearing, 406 F.2d 735 (5th Cir. 1969) (the identity
of the insured was for the jury to determine; dispute whether
insured was corporation or owners of corporation; also trade name
confusion); New York Underwriters Insurance Company v. Union
Construction Company, 432 F.2d 182 (10th Cir. 1970) (agent having
knowledge of the business and intentions of the parties selected
the designation of insured for the policy; insurer estopped from
disputing this intent in contest over coverage); Pacific Insurance
Co. of New York v. Christ ianson. 111 N.W.2d 679 (Iowa 1961)
(individual operator of a shoe repair shop — who is paying
premiums — is insured even though policy is in name of "Kramer
Shoe Repair Shop," and even though he has inherited operations from
retired owner, his father); Brugioni v. Maryland Casualty Company,
382 S.W.2d 707 (Mo. Sup. Ct., Div. No. 2, 1964) (robbery victim
entitled to insurance coverage under bank policy, because he comes
within losses provision, even though not listed as named insured);
Heffler v. Tariff, 57 N.Y.S.2d 583 (N. Y. Sup. Ct. , App. Div.,
16

Applying this law, the facts bearing upon M & C as an insured
are at least sufficiently in conflict to defeat a motion under Rule
56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, if they do not preclude
altogether the argument of Lexington.

For a sampling, please

consider.
1. There is an endorsement to the policy, specifically
naming M & C, and describing the location of the business
to be insured — the same location as the business of M
& C, and where Naylor suffered injury. R. at 301 and
352-368.
2. The endorsement naming M & C is consistent with the
pattern, reflected in the policy, of naming through
endorsement various entities and business locations
intended for coverage. One page alone designates 55
different corporations with addresses across the eastern
seaboard. R. at 301 and 352-368.
3. Lexington apparently does not consider the named
insured (in item one on the declarations page) as the
only insured under the policy. The affidavit of Knox,
submitted in the federal district court action, states
that "21st Century Spas, Ltd.," "Holiday Health, Inc.,"
and "Spa Lady, Inc." are insureds, even though they are
listed on the "cover note," instead of on item one of the
declarations page along with "Spa Health and Fitness
Centers" (which is not listed on the "cover note"). R.
at 300 and 347-351. Moreover, the letter written by Knox
to McConkie, dated January 8, 1991, hints that "Star
Health and Fitness," an entity nowhere listed on the
declarations page or cover note, also may be an insured.
R. at 299-300 and 343-346.

Third Dept., 1945) (named insured was individual partner, while
injured party claimed coverage because of relation with copartnership; where the policy "expressly covered the place of
injury," then the "'name of the insured in the policy is not always
important if the intent to cover the risk is clear1" [citation
omitted]); North American Ace. Ins. Co. v. Canady, 163 P.2d 221
(Okla. 1945) (use of adopted or trade name, rather than real name;
Ml
[i]t is said that in view of the common-law principle that the
office and purpose of a name is only that of identification, if it
is clear that an insurance company is not misled as to the identity
of the applicant, there seems to be no reason why it should be
allowed to avoid the risk on such an account1" [citation omitted]).
17

4. The letter of Knox to McConkie, dated January 8, 1991,
speaking on behalf of Lexington, calls M & C an
"insured." R. at 299-300 and 343-346. This admission
is cogent evidence that M & C is an insured, given the
context of this correspondence. McConkie had written to
Knox, inquiring about a settlement from Lexington on
account of the three defendants in the Rokich litigation.
Her information packet, which" accompanied the letter,
among other things, contained discovery pleadings wherein
CSS and Klc admit the procurement of insurance (the
Lexington policy) for M & C. McConkie is threatening a
judgment by default.
R. at 299 and 3 3 6-342.
Knox
answers McConkie, under threat, and refers to M & C as
an "insured." In the same paragraph of this letter, Knox
denies that CSS is a Lexington insured. R. at 299-3 00
and 343-346. In testimony by affidavit in the federal
district court action, before Judge Sam, Knox backpedalled from these admissions, stating that his
reference to M & C as an "insured" was based upon the
allegations of McConkie in her letter to him, and upon
his "assumption" that these allegations were correct.
R. at 300 and 347-351.
This seems an improbable
"assumption" for a claims adjuster, especially one who
is being threatened with default judgment, and who is
addressing a coverage issue in correspondence to an
adversary. It seems even more unlikely given the care
taken by Knox, in his letter, to distinguish between the
three defendants, owning Fitness and M & C as insureds,
but disowning CSS as such. Nevertheless, under Rule 56,
the lower court should not have resolved these issues of
fact.
On the contrary, the lower court should have
allowed every possible factual inference in favor of
Naylor on thes motion, and that includes the inference,
noted above, that Lexington's own representative admitted
that M & C was insured under the policy.

Additional circumstances belie the subsequent abjuration of
Knox as an employee of Lexington.
By the time he replied to
McConkie, Knox should have made a reasonable investigation of the
Naylor claim — including the identity of the insureds under the
policy. At a minimum, Knox was calling M & C an "insured" after
the time allowed for a reasonable investigation.
The Utah
Insurance Commissioner has promulgated an "Unfair Claims Settlement
Procedures Rule" which "affirmatively establish[es] standards of
equity and good faith to guide licensees in the settlement of
claims." These standards are "minimum standards." Among other
requirements, they impose upon insurers a 45 day limit for the
"complete investigation of a claim," once notice has been given of
the claim to the insurer.
If a longer period is needed, the
insurer has the burden, "by adequate records," of showing this.
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5. As noted above, CSS and Kic admitted, pursuant to
discovery requests in the Rokich litigation, that they
obtained insurance for M & C, and the only policy which
they have identified in this regard is the Lexington
policy. R. at 298-299 and 312-335.
6. M & C paid the premiums for the insurance in question.
R. at 301 and 352-368.
7. On pages 1-2 of a "Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Support of Lexington Insurance Company's
Motion to Intervene" in the action before Judge Rokich,
Lexington states: "While it appears that the property
in question [the M & C property] was in fact insured by
Lexington when plaintiff's cause of action arose, it is
also quite clear that the policy issued by Lexington
simply does not cover the injuries alleged by plaintiff."
R. at 301-302 and 369-370. Although this admission may
be half-hearted, it implies at least property coverage.
And this coverage seems clear from the endorsement to the
policy which lists M & C and gives the address for the
spa in Bountiful.
R. at 301 and 352-368. Moreover,
neither the endorsement nor the policy
anywhere
bifurcates coverage for M & C along the lines drawn in
the above quotation.
And the forms submitted by the
Poulsen agency in connection with the application for M
& C suggest that coverage was intended for liability as

And denying a claim, without conducting a reasonable investigation,
is defined expressly as an unfair and deceptive act and practice.
3 Utah Administrative Code, R590-89-2, R590-89-3, R590-89-11, and
R590-89-7E (1993).
Hence, whether Lexington's notice of the Naylor claim is
measured from March, 1990, when the complaint in the Rokich
litigation was served upon CSS and Klc as agents for Lexington, or
whether it is measured from October, 1990, when after receiving
permission from CSS and Klc, McConkie wrote directly to Lexington,
the 45 day limit under the Utah Insurance Commissioner's
regulations had expired or virtually expired when Knox responded
to McConkie.
(Notice is defined in the Commissioner's rules to
include notice from a third party claimant or his legal
representative, and may be to the insurer or to an agent of the
insurer, R590-89-4.)
Thus, unless Lexington was guilty of an unfair and deceptive
act and practice, it had conducted a reasonable investigation when
it denied the Naylor claim in the letter to McConkie.
It is
improbable that an adjustor for Lexington would have misstated the
identity of the insured after a reasonable investigation.
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well as property.

R. at 301 and 352-368.

The description of law, and the specification of facts, given
above, show that Lexington should not have prevailed on the issue
of the insurer/insured relationship with M & C on a motion for
summary judgment.
CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
Naylor believes that, given the standards under Rule 56, the
motion for summary judgment of Lexington should not have been
granted in the lower court. Triable issues of material fact on the
issue of the intent of the parties under the contract of insurance
respecting the status of M & C as an insured precluded summary
judgment. The judgment of the lower court should be reversed, and
the matter remanded for a trial on the merits.
Dated this

3 °f v day of August, 1994.

Kathleen McConkie or
Alan L. Smith
Attorneys for Naylor
Crippen, McConkie & Cline
1200 Beneficial Life Tower
36 South State Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 537-1508
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